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Evidence on Enrolment Incentives
*
 
Can enrolment incentives reduce the incidence of cream-skimming in the delivery of public 
sector services (e.g. education, health, job training)? In the context of a large government job 
training program, we investigate whether the use of enrolment incentives that set different 
‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients, influence case 
workers’ choice of intake population. Exploiting exogenous variation in these shadow prices, 
we show that training agencies change the composition of their enrollee populations in 
response to changes in the incentives, increasing the relative fraction of subgroups whose 
shadow prices increase. We also show that the increase is due to training agencies enrolling 
at the margin weaker members, in terms of performance, of that subgroup. 
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1-Introduction 
The recent introduction of performance incentives in several branches of the public 
service sector, such as in job training, education, and health, has raised concerns as to 
their impact on enrolment decisions, and on equity and efficiency outcomes. At the center 
of this debate is the issue that incentives induce case workers to cream-skim, that is, to 
select applicants on the basis of performance on measured outcomes instead of value 
added according to the program’s stated objectives (Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond 
1993, Cragg 1997, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 2002). A solution that has been 
proposed to retain control over the recipient population is to adjust the measures that are 
used to assess performance, effectively setting different ‘shadow prices’ for different 
socio-economic subgroups of enrollees. Although such methods are used in practice, and 
their theoretical underpinning is uncontroversial, there is no evidence that adjustment 
models actually have an impact on enrolment decisions.   
Our case study is a large government job training program that changed the 
adjustment method used to assess performance three times during our sample period, 
using four different sets of shadow prices. We use this variation to produce the first 
econometric evidence on whether it is possible to influence case worker intake choices. 
We study the federal program created under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 
which, between 1982 and 2000, provided job training to the economically disadvantaged. 
Under JTPA, job training services were administered by over 620 semi-autonomous sub-
state training agencies each evaluated according to a set of performance measures defined 
at the federal level. Specifically, a training agency’s yearly performance was adjusted 
upwards or downwards to account for the particular mix of persons the agency enrolled.   2
To illustrate, consider the adjustment made to the employment at termination measure for 
enrolling adults who never received a high school degree.
2  By enrolling more high 
school dropouts a training agency lowered the minimum performance (the minimum 
fraction of participants employed at termination) necessary to avoid sanctions and qualify 
for a performance award.    We refer to this minimum performance threshold as the 
performance standard. The adjustment to the standard for enrolling high school dropouts 
varied over time. We test whether case workers respond to the changes in these 
adjustments. We quantify the impact of the adjustment method both on intake 
populations and on performance outcomes.   
There are good reasons to think that JTPA’s adjustment methods may not change 
enrolment patterns in practice. First, case workers’ preferences may vary over socio-
economic subgroups, or case workers may be subject to pressures by local influence 
groups that override the typically weak incentives backing the adjustments (Heckman, 
Smith, and Taber 1996). Second, Heckman and Smith (2004) have shown that most of 
the selection occurs at the early stages of the participation process, such as between 
eligibility and awareness, over which the program staff has little or no control. Thus, 
even if case workers respond to changes in the shadow prices, their response may be 
negligible. Third, adjustment methods may have little impact in practice because they are 
complex. In our case study, for example, the adjustment model can potentially distinguish 
over 16 million different demographic subgroups for each of four different performance 
                                                 
2  The employment at termination measure, the most important measure in the early years 
of JTPA, was defined as the fraction of program terminees who terminated with a job.   3
measures.
3  It may be impossible, or not worthwhile, for a training agency to attempt to 
factor into its enrolment strategy so many ‘shadow prices’.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes how performance adjustment was 
implemented in JTPA, defines the concept of performance adjustment weight (PAW), 
and reviews the literature on performance adjustment in non-job training areas of the 
public and non-profit sectors. Most importantly for our empirical study, we argue that the 
changes in PAW over time in JTPA are exogenous to the training agency’s enrolment 
decision. Section 3 discusses how award maximizing case workers should respond to 
changes in PAW and derives predictions on changes in enrollee population and 
performance outcomes. We test these predictions using micro-level data on case workers’ 
enrolment choices and performance outcomes in JTPA, leveraging three exogenous 
changes in the PAW. We estimate the impact of these changes in PAW following a 
difference-in-difference approach (time and demographic subgroups) at the agency level. 
Our empirical analysis establishes two sets of results. First, we find that changes in 
the incentive for enrolling members of a subgroup significantly change the fraction of 
enrollees from the subgroup. Second, we demonstrate the existence of within-subgroup 
heterogeneity. Case workers increase the number of enrollees from a specific subgroup 
by enrolling at the margin applicants that perform worse on the measure. This finding is 
consistent with the cream-skimming hypothesis that case workers use their private 
information about the eligible population which they use to select enrollees that perform 
well on the performance measures. In contrast with the literature, which focuses on the 
                                                 
324 different adjustment factors have been used during our sample period (see Table 1, 
and the later discussion).    Each adjustment factor takes binary values implying 2
24 
different subgroups.     4
impact of incentives on overall enrolment at the training agency level (differences across 
subgroups), we demonstrate that private information carries through even within the 
demographic subgroups defined by PAW.   
 
Literature 
Our results are of interest to policy makers and academics for three main reasons. 
First, our evidence sheds new light on the literature on cream-skimming. Interestingly, 
the evidence on cream-skimming is mixed (Heckman et al. 1996, Cragg 1997) and one 
might be tempted to conclude that enrolment decisions are not influenced by incentives. 
But most previous JTPA studies have focused on the enrolment incentives due to 
performance measurement without factoring in the role of the adjustment weights in the 
performance standard. They test variants of the following hypothesis: Does rewarding (or 
sanctioning) a training agency based on the fraction of its clients who obtain 
employment, dissuade it from serving high school dropouts and other persons with poor 
labor market prospects?  But the JTPA adjustment model forces the training agency to 
consider how a person’s attributes not only affects the performance outcome but also the 
standard: the agency knows that enrolling a high school dropout lowers its employment 
outcome but it also lowers its standard. Thus, the absence of strong evidence of cream-
skimming may be because the performance standard adjustment procedure was doing its 
job—that is, reducing the incentive to cream-skim—and not because JTPA case workers 
did not respond to incentives. Our study tells a more complex picture where both effects 
are at play: local agencies respond to enrolment incentives but cream-skimming still takes 
place due to unobservable characteristics within demographic subgroups.     5
Second, the issue of allocation of public services receives much attention in the policy 
literature (Heckman and Smith 2004). This debate is fueled by a general concern over 
equity and also because policy makers often have specific target populations that they 
would like served. For example, JTPA itself introduced several constraints on the 
allocation of JTPA entitlements across socio-economic subgroups (Dickenson et al. 
1988). The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), which administered JTPA, defined the 
concept of eligible population to restrict the pool of people who could be served. In 
addition, budget compartmentalization capped the resources that could be used on adults 
and established a minimum expenditure for youth enrollees. The DOL was also desirous 
that the ‘hard-to-serve’ and ‘most-in-need’ not be neglected and supported the states that 
introduced incentives to target resources toward these sub-populations (Barnow 1992, 
Courty and Marschke 2003). Like quotas and budget compartmentalization, PAW are 
objective and transparent, but in contrast to these schemes they leave some discretion to 
local decision makers to exploit potential trade-offs between sub-populations. A 
drawback is that they may convey very complex incentives, and also, perhaps, grant too 
much discretion over unobserved heterogeneity within subgroups. Our work can help 
policy makers understand whether PAW can help achieve equity objectives and/or 
correct distortions due to performance incentives, or whether other methods are needed.     
  Third, this work contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of incentives in the 
public sector. Many policy analysts now believe that such systems can improve 
accountability and management (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Gore 1993)
4 and  such 
                                                 
4  Greater use of performance measurement systems in the public sector has also received 
support in academic circles (National Academy of Public Administration 1991, Wholey 
and Hatry 1992, Bouckaert 1993, Kravchuk and Schack 1996).   6
systems have become policy through the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) of 1993.
5  Our findings can help in the design of future adjustment systems. For 
example, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), which supplanted JTPA in 2000, 
replaced the JTPA’s regression based adjustment model with negotiated performance 
standards. For this and other reasons, policy-analysts have expressed concerns about 
cream-skimming under WIA (Barnow and Smith 2004, U.S. Government Accounting 
Office 2004, Heinrich 2004, Barnow and Heinrich 2008). Some analysts have called for 
the reintroduction of adjustment models in the upcoming reauthorization of WIA. One 
contribution of this paper is to provide some evidence—the first that we know of—that 
job training staff respond to JTPA-style adjustment models and to quantify these 
responses. In fact the literature has repeatedly pointed out the difficulties in separating 
bureaucrat and applicant motives in explaining participation (Heckman and Smith 2004). 
Our evidence circumvents this challenge by using a natural experiment that permits one 
to identify the relation between PAW and enrolment choice. We show that bureaucrats 
respond to sophisticated contracts that involve a large number of implicit prices and 
require the ability to compute complex trade-offs between alternative enrolment 
strategies. Although there may exist bureaucratic preferences over the choice of 
allocations of public resources as suggested by Heckman et al. (1996), our findings show 
that it is possible to influence bureaucratic preferences over intake choice.
6  
                                                 
5  GPRA requires federal agencies to formulate measures of performance and set 
performance goals to improve public accountability and permit scrutiny by congressional 
oversight committees and the public. 
6  Heckman et al. find that JTPA case workers were more likely to enroll the applicants 
with the lowest prospects for employment after training.    Heckman et al. call this 
behavior “cream avoidance” which they attribute to a “social worker mentality” in 
training agency staff.   7
 
2-Performance Adjustment Weights: Background and Case Study 
Much of the literature on PAW has focused on their use as a means to complement 
and fine tune performance incentive systems.
7  The idea is that PAW can help to correct 
enrolment distortions due to the introduction of outcome based performance incentives. 
Performance incentives stimulate agency efforts to produce value added, but they may 
also distort the characteristics of the population the agency selects. This problem has 
emerged with incentive schemes in education that measure school performance using 
standardized test scores (Jacob and Levitt 2003), in job training that evaluate 
performance using labor market outcomes of trainees (Heckman et al. 2002), and in 
health care where doctors and hospitals are evaluated using “report cards” (Dranove, 
Kessler, McClellan, and Satterthwaite 2003).   
The literature on PAW has been mostly conceptual or prescriptive in nature. 
Rubenstein, Schwartz, and Stiefel (2003) and Brooks (2002) lay out rationales for 
adjusting performance standards, compare and contrast different adjustment strategies 
that one might employ, and offer recommendations to policy-makers on how to adjust 
standards. Courty, Heinrich, and Marschke (2005) situate the problem in the principal-
agent framework, and discuss how performance outcome measures should be adjusted. 
Another strand of the literature documents how PAW have been used in the context of 
specific applications.
 Trott and Baj (1987), Barnow (1992), Heinrich (2004), and Barnow 
and Smith (2004) discuss applications to job training programs, Siedlecki and King 
                                                 
7  PAW can also be used in the absence of outcome based incentives, and the point would 
then be to correct possible bias due to bureaucratic preferences.    In fact, policy makers 
may reward bureaucrats for enrolling certain groups if they feel that these groups would 
be otherwise underserved.   8
(2005) to workforce development programs, and Berne (1989), Stiefel, Rubenstein, and 
Schwartz (1999) and Stiefel, Schwartz, Rubenstein, and Zabel (2005) to education.   
 
Case study: JTPA 
A large literature discusses various aspects of the JTPA program (e.g. Johnston 
1987), and offers descriptions of its incentive system (e.g. Courty and Marschke 2003) 
and the bureaucratic responses they induce (e.g. Heckman and Heinrich, forthcoming). 
To reduce unnecessary repetition, we present here only those features of the organization 
that are essential to our analysis of PAW, and direct the reader to more comprehensive 
sources when required.   
The JTPA program was highly decentralized: the 620 plus training agencies 
administered the program with significant discretion over whom to enroll. While 
applicants had to meet an income test to be eligible, JTPA was not an entitlement. Given 
the JTPA annual budget (approximately $4.1 billion in 1993), and the large population 
that was eligible for training, agencies could serve only one to three percent of the 
eligibles (550,000 new participants were enrolled in 1993).
8  The decision of which 
eligibles to enroll constitutes the focus of this paper. 
The Act called for financially-backed performance incentives that would measure and 
reward training agency’s success in developing participants’ human capital, the primary 
goal of the program according to the Act (JTPA, section 106(a)). Congress gave the DOL 
the responsibility of developing a workable set of performance measures that would 
reflect the Act’s mission.    The JTPA fiscal year, or program year, ran from July 1 to 
                                                 
8  See Dickenson et al. (1988) for a complete description of the JTPA eligibility rules.   9
June 30 of the next calendar year.    At the end of each program year, training agencies 
were rewarded (or sanctioned) on the basis of their performance relative to these DOL 
measures.    For the average training agency, the award amounted to about seven percent 
of the operating budget.   
Our empirical analysis focuses on program years 1993-1998 and on the adult JTPA 
population. For the 1993-1998 period, the DOL used four performance measures 
constructed from two labor market outcomes, employment and earnings, to evaluate 
training agencies. A training agency’s employment rate at follow-up (ER) for a particular 
program year was calculated as the fraction of enrollees terminated during that year who 
were employed 13 weeks after termination. The average weekly earnings (WE) was 
calculated as the average weekly earnings during the ninety days following termination 
for those enrollees who were employed 13 weeks after termination. From the ER 
outcome, two performance measures were constructed: one ER measure was based on the 
performance of all adult enrollees and another was based on the performance of only the 
welfare-receiving subset of adult  enrollees.  Similarly,  separate adult and adult welfare 
performance measures were constructed based on  WE.  Each  measure  had  associated  to 
it a separate standard.    The DOL set lower standards for the welfare versions of the 
measures. Meeting these standards was a condition for receiving an award and in many 
states most of the award a training agency was eligible for was paid out for simply 
meeting the standard. Thus, the structure of the incentives under JTPA meant that a 
training agency interested in avoiding sanctions and maximizing its award, should focus 
on meeting its standards.   10
For each of the four standards, the DOL developed an adjustment model to establish a 
training agency-specific standard that accounted for the particular agency’s enrollee 
choices (demographic characteristics of the enrollee pool) and local labor market 
circumstances (socio-economic conditions outside the control of the agency). For 
example, it was determined that training agencies that enrolled few high school dropouts 
should be handicapped relative to those that enrolled more, and that training agencies 
should not be penalized for operating in particularly adverse labor markets. In this study, 
we focus exclusively on the set of factors in the DOL adjustment models that are based 
on the demographic characteristics of the enrollee population, as only these factors can 
influence enrolment decisions.  
  
PAW in JTPA 
To illustrate how the adjustment methodology works, assume two demographic factors, 
gender (female, male) and race (black, non-black). The training agency is rewarded on the 
basis of excess performance, that is, performance above the performance standard. The 
DOL model adjusts the performance standard around an exogenously given baseline level, 
that we denote m0, depending on the characteristics of the enrollee population. Suppose 
an agency enrolled xf percent of females, xb percent of black and denote by βj the 
adjustment weight for demographic characteristic j=f,b. A stylized performance 
adjustment model can be written as   
M0(xf,xb)= m0-(βfxf+βbxb)         (1) 
where M0 is the adjusted performance standard. The higher the standard, the greater is the 
difficulty obtaining an award. We define an adjustment factor as a socio-economic variable   11
(e.g. xf) that is used to correct the standard and an adjustment weight as the numerical value 
that is imputed to correct the standard (e.g. βf). For example, if βf is positive, then the agency 
is more likely to receive an award, ceteris paribus, if it enrolls more females.   
  The DOL chose different sets of factors for each performance measure based upon 
their availability, their statistical relation with the performance measure, and political 
considerations. The first line in Table 1 presents the baseline level (m0), the first column 
in the bottom panel presents the set of adjustment factors (x) for the adult ER and WE 
standards, and the core of the table reports the value of the adjustment weights (β) 
corresponding to these factors.
9  The columns report the weights for different program 
year cycles. The adjustment weights remain in force for two consecutive program years 
before they are updated. Thus for example in program years 1992 and 1993, the 
adjustment weights for the ER standard for females was .072; in program years 1994 and 
1995 it was .056; and so on. They are constructed before the beginning of a new two year 
cycle, using information on demographic characteristics and outcomes observed in the 
previous cycle, as the coefficient estimates from a regression of performance outcomes 
on demographic and labor market characteristics.
10  
  Table 1 shows that the enrolment incentives embedded in the DOL adjustment 
model can significantly impact the performance standard and therefore the agency’s 
likelihood to receive an award. For example, an agency in either 1992 or 1993 enrolling 
only applicants that embodied all of the characteristics associated with positive weights 
                                                 
9  We obtained the adjustment weights from Guide to JTPA Performance Standards for 
Program Years 1992-1993, 1994-1995, 1996-1997, and 1998-1999 published by Social 
Policy Research Associates (see footnote in table 1 for full cites). 
10  For more explanations on the process of estimating the coefficients in the regression 
model, see U.S. Department of Labor (1987), Barnow (1992) or Social Policy Research 
Associates (1999).   12
would face a ‘negative’ performance standard on the employment measure (the 
adjustment, 100Σiβi, is greater than the baseline level implying M0<0), meaning that it 
would not be penalized even if none of its terminees were employed at termination. 
Although this example is extreme, Table 1 reveals that many of the weights can lower the 
employment standard by 10 percent or more. 
Table 2 focuses on the employment measure and presents summary statistics on the 
distribution across agencies of the actual adjustment to the baseline (Σiβixi) by program 
year. Line 1, for example, says that the ER standards in 1993 varied across training 
agencies from 37 percent (86-49) to 74 percent (86-12) to suggesting that a training 
agency’s enrolment pool—which is a choice variable—could greatly influence its 
standard. The adjusted performance standards for the earnings measure (not reported) 
show the same degree of variation.     
The likely impact of PAW on enrolment is difficult to assess on theoretical grounds 
alone. On the one hand, the magnitude of the changes in the weights implies that the 
enrollee intake composition may have a significant impact on the standard. Meeting the 
standard was an issue in practice and could have financial consequences.
11  In fact, over 
the period 1993-1998, on average about 23% of training agencies failed to meet the 
employment rate standard, 6% failed to meet the earnings standard, and 6% failed to meet 
to meet both standards.
12  On the other hand, the number of demographic subgroups, and 
                                                 
11The award for the successful training agency averaged about seven percent of its budget.   
In some states, the highest awards amounted to about sixty percent of the training 
agency’s budget.    The reader who is interested in the details of the incentives 
confronting JTPA training agencies should see Courty and Marschke (2003). 
12  If the performance standards were set too high, so that all training agencies would fail 
no matter how they tried, then the ability to modify a standard using the enrolment 
composition would not matter much, and one would not expect to see enrolment choices   13
thus the number of implied shadow prices, increases exponentially with the number of 
factors. For example, there were 10 factors active in 1993 for the employment at 
termination measure (Table 1) which required the agency to distinguish among 1024 
subgroups. In addition, the PAW varied across performance measures. As a result, PAW 
introduced very complex trade-offs and may have had little consequence in practice. In 
the end, whether PAW influenced intake choices is an empirical issue.   
Table 1 shows that there are significant changes in the adjustment weights over time. 
For example, to meet its employment standard in program years 1992 or 1993, an agency 
that enrolled no ‘high-school dropouts’ would have to achieve an employment rate 18.4 
percent higher than an agency that enrolled only ‘high-school dropouts’ (assuming that all 
other characteristics are equal across the agencies). In program year 1998 or 1999, however, 
the difference drops to 6.6 percent, an order of magnitude of about three. In addition, some 
adjustment factors eventually disappear from the adjustment worksheets and new factors are 
introduced.
13    
To write a micro model of enrolment and for the empirical work as well, it is more 
convenient to work with demographic subgroups instead of demographic characteristics. 
There is a simple correspondence between subgroups and characteristics. In our example, the 
two factors determine four demographic subgroups (black female, black male, and so on). 
Denote s=(sbf,sbm,snf,snm) the enrolment vector measured in percentage of overall population 
over demographic subgroups where sbf, for example, represents the percentage of enrollees 
                                                                                                                                                 
affected by PAW.    This is also true if performance standards were set too low so that all 
training agencies exceeded their standards whether they enrolled purposefully or not.     
13  This lifecycle phenomenon of adjustment weights was observed earlier in JTPA’s 
history by Barnow and Constantine (1988) who attribute it to increased proficiency due 
to learning by the training agencies in selecting enrollees on the basis of factors not 
included in the model.   14
who are black and female. We can rewrite the performance standard as   
M0(n)= m0-(ωbfsbf+ωbmsbm+ωnfsnf+ωnmsnm)      (2) 
where ωbf=βb+βf, captures the decrease in standard due to increasing the fraction of black 
female by one percent, and can be interpreted as the ‘shadow price’ for that demographic 
subgroup. The other coefficients are similarly derived, ωbm=βb, ωnf=βf, ωnm=0. In the rest of 
this paper, we also call the ω adjustment weights, keeping in mind the distinction between 
the β in (1) and ω in (2).   
 
3-Theoretical Predictions 
We present in the appendix a microeconomic model of the training agency choice of 
enrollee population. We derive predictions on how the agency should respond to changes in 
the adjustment weights: how enrolment decisions and performance outcomes should change 
for different demographic subgroups. This section discusses the intuition behind the model 
and summarizes its predictions.     
To simplify, we assume there is a single performance measure and I distinct demographic 
subgroups. The cost of training is assumed subgroup-specific and increasing and convex in 
the number of enrollees. Similarly, average performance decreases with the number of 
enrollees from a specific subgroup. These assumptions are consistent with the following 
interpretation. Applicants differ within a subgroup. Some applicants are easier to train and 
are more likely to achieve successful outcomes than others. It is optimal for the training 
agency to select first the most promising applicants. If the training agency hires more 
applicants of a given subgroup it will hire those who cost more to serve (cost is increasing) 
and who are less likely to perform well (performance increases at a decreasing rate). These   15
assumptions are reasonable if there is some heterogeneity within demographic subgroups that 
is observed by the agency. Cream-skimming becomes possible because the agency enrolls 
those applicants, within a demographic subgroup, who are likely to perform well on the 
measure, irrespectively of how well they perform on the true objective of job training.   
The training agency allocates its budget across the demographic subgroups to maximize 
its award and may also have its own preferences over enrolment choices. We first show that 
under general assumptions about the cost and performance outcome functions, the training 
agency responds to an increase in the adjustment weight of demographic subgroup i by 
enrolling more applicants of subgroup i and fewer applicants of subgroup k≠i. The 
proposition holds independently of the training agency’s own preferences over enrollee 
choices. We then consider the impact of a change in the adjustment weight on the average 
subgroup performance outcome. As the adjustment weight of subgroup i increases, the 
number of enrollees of subgroup i increases and the average performance outcome of 
subgroup i decreases. The reason is simply that to increase its enrolment of applicants of type 
i, the training agency has to enroll less attractive applicants. Marginal enrollees achieve 
lower performance outcomes than average ones.
14  
Under additional assumptions on the model’s primitives, we can derive general 
predictions on the impact of any changes in the performance weights. Specifically, the 
increase in the number of enrollees from subgroup i (Δni) is greater than the same change for 
subgroup k (Δnk) if subgroup i’s adjustment weight increases by a larger amount (or 
decreases by a lower amount) than subgroup k. Formally, Δni>Δnk if and only if δi>δk for any 
i and k, where δi denotes the change in weight i. The result also applies to changes in the 
                                                 
14  To simplify, we assume that the training treatment is constant across groups.     16
fraction of enrollees and this constitutes the focus of our empirical investigation (Hypothesis 
H1). The result on average performance outcomes also generalizes to any change in weight: 
the change in average performance of subgroup i is lower than the change in average 
performance of subgroup k if δi>δk (Hypothesis H2). The remainder of this paper tests 
hypothesis H1 and H2.   
 
4-Data and Empirical Strategy 
The variables we wish to explain with our analysis, measured at the level of 
demographic subgroup-agency-year, are the enrolment shares and the performance outcomes. 
To compute these variables, we use data from the Standardized Program Information Report 
which are collected by the U.S. Department of Labor and distributed by the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute of Employment Research. Appendix 2 explains in detail how we constructed our 
panel data of demographic subgroups, agencies, and years. Consistent with the JTPA 
incentives, we form the subgroups based on the terminees in the program year, not the 
enrollees. We do this because the adjustment model modifies the standards based on the 
characteristics of the program year’s terminees.
15 
Recall that using all 24 factors would generate more than 16 millions subgroups. Since 
the JTPA enrollee population is much smaller (for the enrolment analysis, for example, we 
have information on 682,515 terminees over the 6 program years), we eliminate all the 
                                                 
15  Of course, the terminee population closely resembles the enrollee population. We are 
explicitly assuming that the training agencies anticipate the effects of its enrolment 
decisions on the performance standards which is the case when the standard remains 
unchanged. This is reasonable because the average length of training (a few months) is 
short relative to the period during which the weights remain constant (two years). We 
have considered the possibility of delays in the enrolment responses after the three 
changes in the PAW that took place in our sample period and this did not change the 
results.   17
subgroups for which we have no or few enrollees. In the end, we select 13 factors and 
construct 1,670 different subgroups for which we have information over all 6 years in at least 
one agency. This yields an average of 291 subgroups per agency-year. Table 3 presents 
descriptive statistics for our main variables (PAW, enrolment shares, and performance 
outcomes).  
Table 1 and 2 demonstrate that there is much variation across years in our explanatory 
variables. Table 4 shows that there is also much variation from year to year in the enrolment 
size of the demographic subgroups identified by the DOL adjustment factors. We investigate 
whether this variation in enrolment can be explained by the changes in adjustment weights as 
predicted by (H1). 
 
Multi-dimensionality  
Each of the four standards had its own adjustment weights that could potentially 
influence the enrollee intake choice (H1) and also the performance outcomes (H2). Under 
JTPA, states were responsible for designing the incentive contracts using the four measures 
proposed by the DOL. Although these contracts vary greatly from state to state (different 
emphasis on the different measures and different choice of the award function), we can 
leverage three patterns that are common to all contracts to cope with the multi-dimensional 
nature of the incentive system. To start, the employment measure received a disproportionate 
emphasis in determining the award (Courty and Marschke, 2003). Moreover, awards were 
largely allocated for meeting standards and training agencies were more likely to fail the 
employment standards. Third, the PAW for the two welfare measure standards apply only to 
welfare subgroups and therefore should not influence the choice of non-welfare enrollees.     18
Given these considerations, we proceed as follows. We initially test H1 and H2 using 
the adjustment weights on the adult ER performance measure. In focusing on the 
employment measure, this approach follows the policy evaluation literature (e.g., Anderson 
et al.1993) and is justified by the first two characteristics of the incentive contracts 
mentioned above. Later, we introduce the adjustment weights on the WE standard. Since we 
do not have information on the contracts, we employ a general specification for how ER and 
WE could influence enrolment and outcomes that allows for interaction effects. This first set 
of analyses is valid under the assumption that the change in weights that apply to the welfare 
measures are independent from the change in weights that apply to the two measures we 
consider. As a robustness check, we reproduce the previous analyses without the welfare 
subgroups. The third characteristic of the incentive system implies that H1 and H2 hold for 
this subset of the sample even if the above assumption does not hold.   
 
Exogeneity of the changes in the PAW 
The PAW were changed three times in our sample period (see Table 1). In the 
empirical analysis, we assume that these changes are exogenous to contemporaneous 
enrolment decisions. Several arguments support this assumption. Recall that the PAW 
were computed as coefficient estimates of a regression of performance outcomes on 
demographic factors using performance data (from all training agencies) in the previous 
two year cycle. The DOL regression model used to compute the PAW was unstable and 
this was due to multi-colinearity between factors. Consistent with this view, Table 1 
shows that the choice of demographic factors varied greatly over time (only 9 out of 24 
demographic factors were used throughout our period). This choice was partially driven   19
by the concern to keep the PAW positive (since all the selected factors represented 
priority target subpopulations) and by current political considerations. The change in the 
PAW are exogenous if they are mainly driven by the arbitrary choice of the factors 
included and the sample realization of the two year cohort used to compute the regression 
coefficients.  
But changes in the PAW could also be driven by changes in labor market conditions 
and/or changes in enrolment strategies. We argue that this is not an important issue for 
our empirical exercise, and if anything, it can only create an under-estimation of the 
agency responses. Consider first the later point. The concern is endogeneity of the PAW 
through strategic inter-temporal enrolment behavior. The behavior of all agencies as a 
group influences changes in the weights, because the DOL used the information collected 
on past enrolment choices and outcomes to update the weights, but an individual agency 
can be assumed to maximize the current period award myopically since the impact of its 
enrolment decisions on future weights is negligible. Consider next changes in labor 
market conditions. To start, assume that these changes are conditionally uncorrelated (e.g. 
random walk or permanent changes). Such changes would influence the PAW (through 
the regression model) but this would not introduce an endogeneity problem since the 
change in next period labor market conditions is uncorrelated with the current change in 
PAW. The only concern are trends in labor market conditions. Such trends could bias the 
inference against our hypothesis. Assume for example that the labor market potential of a 
subgroup starts to degrade. This increases that subgroup’s PAW but the increase under-
compensates for the continuing degradation in the subgroup’s potential so we would 
under-estimate the enrolment response relative to the response that would take place with   20
a truly exogenous change in PAW.   
 
Empirical strategy 
Denote siat as the share of enrollees of demographic subgroup i in agency a in year t 
and wit the adjustment weight, common to all agencies, for subgroup i and year t.
16 H1 
implies an increasing relation between changes in relative weights and changes in relative 
shares of subgroups. We test this relation using the three changes in adjustment weights that 
took place in our sample period (the weights changed at the end of 1993, 1995, and 1997).   
We propose different specifications to test H1 that are variations around the following 
approach. Assuming that the increasing relation implied by H1 is linear and does not vary 
across subgroups, agencies, or years gives 
(siat-siat’)-(skat-skat’)=γ[(wit-wit’)-(wkt-wkt’)]  for  all  i,k,a,t,t’    (H1’) 
where the parameter of interest γ is positive. Instead of comparing pairs of demographic 
subgroup-years, which does not naturally fit a regression framework, we aggregate this 
hypothesis to obtain a relation that can be estimated using a fixed-effect regression 
framework.
17  Formally, H1’ is averaged over subgroups k and years t’ to obtain 
siat= -(sa- γwa)+(sai-γwai)+(sat-γwat)+γwit  for  all  i,a,t 
where sa denotes the average share in agency a across all years and subgroups, sai the average 
i share in agency a across all years and similarly for sat and the w averages. We can rewrite 
                                                 







 where  niat is the number of enrollees of group i in agency a 
and year t.   
17  Alternatively we could choose a subgroup to serve as the reference subgroup against 
which we compare all other subgroups but the choice of the reference subgroup is 
arbitrary.     21
this relation as a difference in difference (time and subgroup) equation at the agency level 
 s iat= αa+αai+αat+γwit  for  all  i,a,t. 
The observed shares could vary randomly because they are measured with error (which is the 
case in our application since only a representative sample of 62 percent of total population is 
included in our dataset).
18  We obtain the following empirical model 
siat= α+αai+αat+γwit +εait  ( 3 )  
where α is a constant, αai is a subgroup-agency fixed effect and αat is an agency-time fixed 
effect. We assume εiat is normal, mean zero, and distributed independently across training 
agencies.  
The theory makes no prediction on (α,αai,αat) but predicts that γ should be positive. 
Specification (3) tests an averaged version of H1. We interpret γ as the average effect over all 
training agencies, all year changes, and subgroups. We cluster the errors at the training 
agency level to permit arbitrary forms of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity within 
training agency panels.       
To test H2, we follow a similar procedure. We estimate the performance of each 
subgroup holding constant agency-subgroup and agency-time fixed effects   
miat= θ+θai+θat+θwit+ ijt υ  for  all  i,a,t    (4) 
where as before θai and θat allows for agency-subgroup and agency-time fixed effects. The 
parameter of interest is θ, which our model predicts is negative. As with (3), we assume  ijt υ  
is normal, mean zero, and distributed independently across training agencies and we cluster 
the errors at the training agency level. 
                                                 
18  Alternatively, we could derive the econometric model following a random utility 
approach, assuming that agencies have group preferences that vary randomly over time.   22
In all specifications reported to test H1 and H2, we weight each subgroup-agency-year 
observation by the subgroup-agency share of the entire terminee population.
19  We have also 
considered two variant specifications and the results were not affected (not reported): one 
with equal weights and another with weights proportional to the subgroup’s share relative to 
its agency population. In addition, we have considered specifications where, constructing the 
subgroups, we exclude those enrollees who are terminated in the first four months of each 
two year cycle. Our reasoning is that enrollees entering a new two year cycle may have been 




5-1 Tests of H1 and H2 for the ER Adjustment Weights 
Table 5 reports the results from our estimation of the enrolment decision model, 
equation (3). In all specifications the dependent variable is the subgroup’s termination share. 
The right-hand side of the regression includes the subgroup’s weight for the employment 
standard (ER) in addition to the αai and αat.  
Model 1 produces a positive and statistically significant estimate of the ER weight 
coefficient, a finding that is consistent with H1. To give the reader an idea of the magnitude 
of the impact of the weight change on enrollee choice, we include the standardized 
coefficients. Literally interpreted, our result says that a one standard deviation in a 
                                                 









 where  niat is the number of 
enrollees in subgroup i in agency a in year t.     
20  We chose four months, because the average enrolment duration is between four and 
five months long. Five months into the new cycle, we reason, enrollees will be 
terminating in the cycle in which they were intended to be terminated.   23
subgroup’s performance weight relative to the average ER weight increases the subgroup’s 
enrolment share by about .1 percent relative to the average agency subgroup. This response, 
however, is measured at the subgroup level which is the correct unit of analysis to understand 
agency behavior, but is of limited relevance from an economic or policy point of view. To 
assess the economic significance of this response, consider the following thought experiment. 
Assume a coefficient on a demographic characteristic, e.g. female, is increased by a standard 
deviation relative to the average coefficient. The enrolment share of all female subgroups 
will increase by about .1 percent relative to the average subgroup. Since there are on average 
291 subgroups per agency in our sample (see Appendix 2), the overall increase in the share 
of females will be 14.7 percent (0.00101*291/2, because half of the subgroups are female on 
average). The female PAW alone can have a large impact on the composition of the enrollee 
population. But there are approximately a dozen demographic characteristics in play in the 
analysis suggesting that changes in PAW do have a significant influence on enrolment.   
Model 3 includes both the subgroup’s ER and WE adjustment weights. The coefficient 
estimate on the employment weight (in raw and standardized form) changes little from 
column 1. This finding supports our assumption that there is little interaction between the 
different measures of the incentive system. 
Table 6, column 1, reports the results of the employment outcome estimation (equation 
4). We find a statistically significant and negative coefficient estimate on the employment 
weight, as predicted under H2. The magnitude of the estimate suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in a subgroup’s ER weight relative to the average ER weight decreases the 
subgroup’s relative employment rate by about 2 points. This result remains when we add the 
earnings weight as an explanatory variable. To assess the economic implication of this result,   24
consider the thought experiment discussed above. Increasing the female weight by one 
standard deviation decreases the performance of females relative to the average subgroup 
performance by 2 points. This figure seems reasonable to us considering that this change in 
weight is associated with a 14.7 percent increase in the relative share of females. The quality 
of the marginal enrollee within a subgroup decreases as more enrollees are drawn from this 
subgroup, which is consistent with the hypothesis that agencies cream-skim the best 
enrollees within each subgroup. Still, this figure is small relative to the variation in 
performance across demographic subgroups. Table 3 shows that the standard deviation in the 
employment outcome across all subgroups and years is 43 points.
21  Therefore the potential 
to cream-skim across subgroups (which can be curbed with the PAW) is of an order of 
magnitude greater than within subgroups (which is unaffected by the PAW). The PAW can 
eliminate the incentive to cream-skim across-subgroups leaving a residual incentive to 
cream-skim within subgroup which is second order. 
 
5-2 Additional Measures and Robustness 
The previous analysis is valid under the assumption that the ER has received the most 
emphasis in the incentive scheme, as has been argued in the literature, and consistent with 
the observation that the failure rate is much larger for the ER measure, or under the 
alternative assumption that the variation in the different enrolment incentives associated with 
                                                 
21  What is relevant for cream-skimming across subgroups in the absence of PAW are the 
predictable differences across subgroups at the agency level.    To capture this, we first 
take a year average of the subgroup performance at the agency level (this eliminates the 
unpredictable component of performance that is irrelevant in cream-skimming), then 
compute the standard deviation in subgroup performance at the agency level, and finally 
take the average across all agencies. We obtain an average standard deviation of 43.6 
which is very similar to the above figure.     25
each set of weights are orthogonal to one another. Still, multi-dimensional incentives may 
matter. We address this issue in two ways. First, we test H1 and H2 for the adjustment 
weights on the WE measure but the results are inconclusive. Second, we consider the impact 
of the weights on both the ER and WE measures on the sub sample of non-welfare recipients 
and the logic is that the weights on the other two measures (the welfare ones) should not 
influence the enrolment incentives among the non-welfare sub populations. The results on 
the WE weights obtained from this sub-sample are consistent with H1 and H2 and we 
propose a possible interpretation that reconciles these two new sets of results. 
 
Adjustment Weights on the Earnings Performance Measure (WE) 
Table 5, columns 2 and 3, show the impact of the WE adjustment weights on the 
enrolment decision. Both columns show no impact which goes against H1. Table 7 reports 
the results of the earnings outcome specification (model (4) applied to WE). Whether we 
estimate the model with just the earnings weight or both the earnings and employment 
weights, the estimated coefficient on the earnings weight is statistically insignificant against 
H2.
22  These two results could be because the WE measure plays a lesser role in the incentive 
system or because the agencies have less discretion to select enrollees who are likely to 
perform well on the WE measure.   
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate corresponding to the employment weight in table 
7, column 2, is positive and significant (p value 0.001). While there are many potential 
explanations for this finding, it is consistent with the existence of a trade-off under multi-
                                                 
22  The number of observations used in this analysis is smaller than in the employment 
analysis because, consistent with the JTPA definition of the earnings measure, we use 
only the enrollees who are employed (by the employment measure definition) in the 
calculation of the earnings outcome.   26
dimensional incentives: the kinds of enrollees within a subgroup that produce higher 
employment outcomes, reduce earning outcomes.   
 
Non-Welfare Recipients 
The training agency’s decision to enroll adult non-welfare recipients is less complicated 
than the decision to enroll welfare ones because non-welfare recipients’ characteristics enter 
into the determination of only the two standards that have been the focus of this analysis. If 
the welfare measures play an important role, we should obtain a cleaner test of H1 and H2 
when we limit the analysis to the non-welfare adults. Therefore, Table 8 shows the results of 
the previous analyses excluding the welfare recipients.   
Two points should be made. First, the power of the significance tests is smaller after we 
exclude welfare recipients, which constitute about 40 percent of the adult population. This is 
partly responsible for why we observe that the coefficient estimates on the employment 
weight in the enrolment share (model 1) and outcome regressions (models 2 and 3) are 
insignificant. Second, the impact of the earnings weight in the regressions is greater when we 
exclude welfare recipients. In the enrolment share regression, though the coefficient estimate 
on earnings weight remains insignificant (by conventional significance standards) it is 
positive (as predicted under H1). The coefficient estimate on earnings weight in the earnings 
outcome regression (model 3) is now both negative and significant as predicted under H2. 
The standardized coefficient corresponding to this estimate is about -6 suggesting that a one 
standard deviation increase in the WE weight relative to the average WE weight reduces the 
relative subgroup earnings per week by about $6.   
Taken together, these two new sets of results suggest that although H2 does not hold for   27
the entire sample, it does hold for the subset of non-welfare recipients. This may be because 
agencies have much more discretion to select applicants who are likely to perform well on 
the earnings measure, when they have to choose among non-welfare recipients, than they do 
for welfare recipients, who have on average lower levels of human capital. Also the earnings 
measure is calculated only off employed terminees. Because welfare recipients are less likely 
to be employed their prospective earnings might not be of such concern in the enrolment 
decision. 
 
5-Summary and Conclusions 
The recent introduction of performance incentives in several branches of the public 
service sector, such as in job training, education, and health, has raised concerns as to 
their impact on enrolment decisions. In particular, rewarding public agencies based on 
measurable outcomes such as employment outcomes, test scores, or health outcomes may 
lead to student-tracking in education or the neglect of the hard-to-serve in job training 
and of the chronically ill in health care. To retain control over the recipient population, 
some policy-makers have proposed adjusting the measures that are used to assess 
performance, effectively setting different ‘shadow prices’ for different subgroups of 
clients, but little evidence exists about the effectiveness of these methods in practice.   
In the context of a large government job training program, we investigate the 
influence of enrolment incentives on case workers’ choice of intake population. Job 
training agencies in this program are rewarded for improving the labor market 
performance of the clients they serve but the reward function also depends on the 
enrolment choice. The main objective of the enrolment incentives is to level the playing   28
field, so that a training agency enrolling less able applicants has to meet a lower level of 
performance, effectively setting a system of shadow prices that correct for the challenge 
that each demographic subgroup presents.   
Our empirical analysis establishes two sets of results. First, we measure the impact 
of changes in the relative shadow prices on changes in the relative fraction of different 
demographic subgroups. We find that changes in the incentive for enrolling members of a 
subgroup significantly change the fraction of enrollees from this subgroup. This is good 
news for those who wish to use PAW in job training and in other public services to 
attenuate the negative distributional consequences of performance-based incentive 
systems. One should keep in mind that the effectiveness of PAW elsewhere, however, will 
depend on the nature of the heterogeneity among participants and in the ability of the 
designer to identify dimensions over which cream-skimming takes place. 
Second, we demonstrate the existence of within-subgroup heterogeneity. Case 
workers increase the number of enrollees from a specific subgroup by enrolling at the 
margin applicants that perform worse on the measure. That is, case-workers appear to be 
cream-skimming: they use their private information about applicant heterogeneity within 
subgroups. In contrast with the literature, which focuses on the impact of incentives on 
enrolment at the training agency level, we demonstrate that private information carries 
through even within the demographic subgroups defined by PAW. We show, however, 
that the potential for cream-skimming within subgroups is second order relative to across 
subgroup cream-skimming. 
In this paper, we took the DOL methodology as given and investigated whether 
training agencies respond to exogenous changes in the enrolment incentives. An   29
important issue that we did not address is to evaluate the choice of the DOL’s methods for 
determining the PAW. Did the DOL methodology achieve a reduction in cream-skimming 
or some other objective (e.g. channeling resources toward the subgroups with the highest 
earning impact)? We leave for future research the issue of determining how to set the 
PAW to achieve a given objective and to evaluate the impact of the PAW set by the DOL 
on cream-skimming.     30
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Table 1: Baseline Levels and Adjustment Factors and Weights, Program Years 1992-1999 
  Follow-up Entered Employment Rate   
(ER, %) 
Follow-up Weekly Earnings   
(WE, $/week) 
1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 
Baseline level (m0)  86 88 88 77  266  301  361  376 
Adjustment Factors (x)  Adjustment Weights (β) 
Female*  0.072 0.056 0.052 0.050 0.425 0.443 0.602 0.683 
55 years old & over  --  0.118  0.105  0.130  1.126  0.774  0.484  0.61 
age  30  to  54*  --  0.098  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Black*  0.064 0.086 0.035 0.027 0.270 0.325 0.226 0.177 
Other  minority*  -- -- -- -- --  0.100  0.042  0.065 
Minority  male*  -- -- --  0.026  -- --  0.279  0.306 
High  school  dropout*  0.184 0.084 0.073 0.066 0.271 0.276  0.24  0.145 
Post high school attendees*  --  -0.066  -0.032 -0.008 -0.415 -0.659 -0.235 -0.334 
High school dropout under 30  --  --  0.02  0.015  --  --  --  0.088 
Handicapped  0.083 0.09 0.075  0.096  0.367  0.558 0.28 0.315 
UI or UC claimant  --  --  -0.037 -0.022 -1.062 -0.361 -0.127 -0.081 
Long-term  AFDC  recipient*  0.151 0.234 0.025 0.018  --  --  --  0.086 
Cash  welfare  recipient*  --  -- 0.054  0.031 --  -- 0.093  0.072 
SSI  recipient  --  -- 0.091  0.133 --  -- 0.027  0.265 
Offender*  --  0.057  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Limited  English  speaking  -- -- -- -- -- --  0.259  0.251 
Basic  skills  deficient  --  -- 0.034  0.037 --  -- 0.193  0.286 
Reading  skills  below  7th  grade -- 0.032 --  -- 0.148  0.344 --  -- 
Lacking significant work 
history*  0.074 0.059 0.050 0.055 0.292 0.144 0.150 0.098 
Unemployed 15 weeks or more*  0.111  0.103  0.086  0.073  --  0.242  0.091  0.076 
Not in the labor force*  0.122  0.113  0.103  0.108  --  --  --  0.044 
GA/RCA  recipient  0.137  0.05  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Veteran (Vietnam era veteran)  0.160  0.135  0.030  0.081  --  --  --  -- 
Homeless  -- -- --  0.043  0.595  0.602  --  0.136 
*An adjustment factor that is included in our analysis.     
Notes:   
1.  A factor was excluded from out analysis if either (1) the factor described hardly any or almost all individuals (i.e, 
its mean fell outside the [.1,.9] interval) or (2) factor information was missing for more than 10% of the 
observations (16% of observations lacked information on the variable Basic skills deficient, and 11% of 
observations lacked information on the variable Reading skills below 7
th grade).     
2.  The data in this table come from Guide for Setting JTPA Performance Standards for Program Year 1992-3 (1993), 
Guide to JTPA Performance Standards for Program Years 1994 and 1995 (1995), Guide to JTPA Performance 
Standards for Program Years 1996 and 1997 (1997), and Guide to JTPA Performance Standards for Program Years 
1998 and 1999 (1999), Menlo Park, Calif.: Social Policy Research Associates.   36




Year  Mean Std.  Dev. Min.  Max Number of 
Agencies 
      
1993 25.405 4.793 11.760  49.428  639 
1994 27.620 4.832 14.098  49.362  627 
1995 27.250 5.045 13.992  50.293  665 
1996 18.061 3.745  9.250 39.600  634 
1997 17.415 3.781  5.400 36.072  663 
1998 17.426 3.632  4.050 31.913  610 
1993-1998  22.225 6.344  4.050 50.293 3838 
(1
) We compute for each agency the adjustment to the baseline level Σiβixi using the 
agency’s actual enrollee population.    The summary statistics reported here are based on 
the distribution of Σiβixi across agencies.   37
Table 3: Summary statistics 
  Mean  SD  Min  25 Pctl 50 Pctl 75 Pctl  Max 
Dependent Variables 
Enrollee  Share  0.003 0.008  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 1.000 
Employment Rate (%)    67.7  42.8  0.0  0.0  100  100  100 
Earnings Outcome ($/week)  313.4  164.7  0.0  220.0  280.2  365.5  6997.9 
Independent Variables 
Employment  Weight  0.221 0.133  -0.066 0.130 0.202 0.202 0.286 
Earnings  Weight  0.527 0.418  -0.659 0.253 0.581 0.841 1.430 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Adjustment Factors 
 Percentage  of  Terminees 
 By  Program  Year 
Adjustment  Factors  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Female*  63.03 65.80 66.50 67.56 66.88 65.64 65.81 
55 years old & over  2.12  2.05  1.99  1.78  1.86  2.16  2.00 
age 30 to 54*  56.45  56.32  56.52  57.25  57.67  57.65  56.91 
Black*  29.52 30.04 31.85 33.26 33.55 34.61 31.91 
Other  minority*  18.58 19.49 20.58 22.16 21.03 23.08 20.64 
Minority  male*  17.49 16.99 17.64 17.95 17.91 19.67 17.85 
High  school  dropout*  21.05 22.08 20.66 20.51 19.59 20.51 20.79 
Post high school attendees*  21.26  22.28  23.69  24.26  24.51  23.81  23.21 
High school dropout under 30  9.50  9.80  9.23  9.03  8.32  8.56  9.12 
Handicapped  13.66  8.22 7.69 7.23 7.12 6.54 8.57 
UI or UC claimant  14.26  10.62  9.40  9.56  9.34  9.36  10.57 
Long-term  AFDC  recipient*  15.87 15.81 16.47 16.16 15.55 13.43 15.63 
Cash  welfare  recipient*  39.61 42.91 42.25 40.08 37.28 32.33 39.41 
SSI  recipient  3.00 3.37 3.30 3.34 3.58 3.49 3.33 
Offender*  13.05 13.46 13.57 14.82 16.06 17.26 14.52 
Limited  English  speaking  5.10 4.68 4.18 4.48 4.10 4.84 4.58 
Basic  skills  deficient  57.50 58.69 55.59 54.68 54.61 56.42 56.28 
Reading skills below 7th grade  14.31  15.62  13.60  13.41  12.50  13.78  13.95 
Lacking significant work 
history*  35.06 34.81 35.40 36.61 34.98 34.17 35.18 
Unemployed 15 weeks or 
more*  41.49 36.54 33.36 31.26 31.46 31.16 34.62 
Not in the labor force*  29.85  32.63  35.45  37.16  33.00  29.89  32.98 
GA/RCA  recipient  5.52 5.93 4.95 4.19 3.40 2.98 4.63 
Veteran  (Vietnam  era  veteran) 9.52 7.83 7.44 7.00 6.98 6.39 7.64 
Homeless  4.38 2.22 2.42 2.63 2.57 2.40 2.81 
Total Number of Terminees  138533 136834 121086 112822 110648 95653  715576
*Thirteen adjustment factors included in the analysis (see Table 1, Note 1)   39
 
Table 5 
Determinants of Subgroup Enrolment Share 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Independent Variable  Coef. Est. 
Stand’ized 
Coef. Coef.  Est.
Stand’ized 
Coef.  Coef. Est. 
Stand’ized 
Coef. 
          
Employment Weight  0.00759  0.00101     0.00773  0.00103 
   (0.00219) 
0.001 
   (0.00222) 
0.014 
 
Earnings Weight     0.00007  0.00003  -0.00042  -0.00018 
       (0.00059)
0.900 
  (0.00059) 
0.865 
 
Constant  0.00799   0.00777    0.00798   




  (0.00006) 
0.256 
 
Observations 738689    738689    738689   
R-squared 0.49    0.49    0.49   
Notes: 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
2.  P values in italics. 
3.  Errors clustered on training agencies. 
4.  All models include fixed effects (see equation 3 in text) . 
5.  All models are weighted by the subgroup-agency share of the entire terminee population. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Subgroup Employment Outcome (ER) 
 (1)  (2) 
Independent Variable  Coef. Est. 
Stand’ized 
Coef.  Coef. Est.  Stand’ized Coef. 
       
Employment Weight  -14.86782   -2.03719  -15.42228   -2.11317  
   (3.42407) 
0.000 
  (3.44840) 
0.000 
 
Earnings Weight     1.36506  0.56749  
       (1.34891) 
0.312 
 
Constant  1.84150      1.86583     





Observations 164488    164488   
R-squared  0.46  0.46   
Notes: 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses.   
2.  P values in italics. 
3.  Errors clustered on training agencies. 
4.  All models include fixed effects (see equation 4 in text). 
5.  All models are weighted by the subgroup-agency share of the entire terminee population. 
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Table 7 
Determinants of Subgroup Weekly Earnings Outcome (WE) 
  (1) (2) 
Independent Variable  Coef. Est. 
Stand’ized 
Coef. Coef.  Est. 
Stand’ized 
Coef. 
      
Employment Weight     52.52690  6.92964  
       (15.31844) 
0.001  
 
Earnings Weight  3.02610  1.25155   -0.58678  -0.24268  
   (6.52741) 
0.643 
  (6.39005) 
0.927  
 
Constant  3.93647  6.66870  





Observations 122467    122467   
R-squared 0.52    0.52   
Notes: 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses.   
2.  P values in italics. 
3.  Errors clustered on training agencies. 
4.  All models include fixed effects (see equation 4 in text). 
5.  All models are weighted by the subgroup-agency share of the entire terminee population. 
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Table 8 
Analysis omitting welfare recipients 
 Dependent  Variable 
Enrolment Share  Employment Outcome Earnings Outcome 
Independent Variable  Coef. Est. 
Stand’ized 
Coef. Coef.  Est.
Stand’ized 
Coef. Coef.  Est.
Stand’ized 
Coef. 
        
Employment Weight  0.00493  0.00052  -3.51101  -0.36899  37.22452  3.79134  







Earnings Weight  0.00315  0.00129  -1.35605  -0.55022  -14.19245 -5.70765  







Constant  0.01473  2.20412  1.18350  







Observations  366682   92187  71800  
R-squared  0.45  0.42  0.49  
Notes: 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses.   
2.  P values in italics. 
3.  Errors clustered on training agencies. 
4.  All models include fixed effects (see equations 3 and 4 in the text). 
5.  All models are weighted by the subgroup-agency share of the non-welfare recipient population.   43
Appendix 1: Derivations of H1 and H2 
 
There are I demographic groups. Any applicant belongs to one and only one group. The 
training agency enrolls ni applicants of demographic group i. The enrolment vector is 
denoted n=(n1,..,nI) and the total number of enrollees is N=Σini. The cost of training ni 
enrollees of group i is ci(ni) and the aggregate performance outcome for group i is mi(ni) with 
mi(0)≥0. Since more enrollees imply higher outcomes, we assume that m’i(ni)>0. As 
discussed in Section 3, we assume that c’i(ni)>0, c’’i(ni)≥0 and m’’i(ni)<0.  
The aggregate performance outcome is the sum of performance outcomes over all groups, 
M(n)=Σ imi(ni). The performance standard adjusts a baseline level m0 for the enrollee 
composition  
M0(n)= m0-Σ iβini 
where βi is the adjustment weight for demographic group i. We denote β the vector of 
adjustment weights. The training agency is rewarded on the basis of excess performance 
Δ(n)=M(n)-M0(n). 
The training agency cares about the performance award and may also have its own 
preference over enrollees. The training agency has objective function U(n,Δ) where the first 
argument captures agency preferences over enrollee choices. To simplify, we consider the 
following functional form,   
U(n,Δ)=Σiαini+Δ 
where αi is a real number that captures the marginal preference attributed to demographic 
group i. The overall level of α defines how the training agency is willing to compromise its 
own preferences over enrolment for higher performance award. The training agency chooses 
n to maximize U(n,Δ(n)) subject to the budget constraint Σ ici(ni)≤B. 
The designer may change one or more weights at a time. In general, the designer changes 
adjustment weight i by δi where δ=(δ1,.., δI) is the vector of changes in weights. Denote 
∑ =
i i N δ δ / 1   and the adjustment weight on measure i by βi+εδi where ε∈[0,1].  
 
Results 
Proposition 1 derives a general result in the case where a single weight is changed, 
δ=(0..0,δi=1,0..0). Proposition 2 considers any change in the vector of weights.   
Proposition 1: (a) dni/dβi≥0 and dnj/dβi≤0 for j≠i and these inequalities are strict for any 
interior solution (ni>0). (b) d[mi(ni)/ni]/dβi≤0 and the inequality is strict for any interior 
solution. 
Denote ni(ε) the number of enrollees of group i as a function of ε, Δni=ni(1)-ni(0) the 
change in the number of enrollees of group i, and Δ(ni/N) the same change measured in 
percentage terms. Similarly, we define Δ[mi(ni)/ni] as the change in average performance. 
Proposition 2 derives general predictions on the impact of any change in the performance 
weights.  
Proposition 2: Assume c’i(n)=c’k(n)=c and m’’i(n)=m’’k(n)=m. (a) Δni>Δnk iff δi>δk. (a’) 
a) Δ(ni/Ν)>Δ(nk/N) iff δi>δk. (b) Δ[mi(ni)/ni]<Δ[mk(nk)/nk]≤0 if δi>δ >δk. (c) If mi(0)=0 and 
βi=β then Δ[mi(ni)/ni]<Δ[mk(nk)/nk]≤0 if δi>δk. 
Proposition 2 holds if the cost and performance measure functions have a linear and 
quadratic structure respectively, ci(ni)=co,i+c1ni and mi(ni)= m0,i+m1,ini+m2ni
2. It does not say   44
anything about the direction of the change in the number of enrollees of group i or k. The 
total number of enrollees of group i could increase or decrease and similarly for group k. The 
proposition makes a prediction on the relative change in enrollees. The assumptions stated in 
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ε  in  general. 
Proofs 
We first derive a general result that is used in the proofs of both propositions. Denote λ the 
Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. In any interior solution (ni>0), the first order 
condition says   
m’i(ni)+αi+εδi+βi =λc’i(ni). 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
(a) Set δi=1 and δj=0 for j≠i in expression (A) and conclude using the identity dnj/dαi= dnj/dε.  


























But since mi is concave, we have m’(n)n≤m(n)-m(0), and the assumption m(0)≥0 implies 
mi’ni-mi<0. We conclude that d[mi(ni)/ni]/dαi<0. QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(a) Under the assumptions stated in proposition 2, expression (A) becomes   45















dn k i >  and  since 
ε d
dni  is  linear  in  δi we have Δni/Δnk>1.  
(b) We have, (d/dε)[mi(ni)/ni]= ( ) δ δ − − i i i n K ) (  where  Ki is a positive function.   
(c) We have, (d/dε)[mi(ni)/ni]= ( ) δ δ − − i K   where K is a positive constant. QED  46
Appendix 2: Demographic Subgroup and Variable Construction   
 
The use of the DOL PAW methodology was not mandated in JTPA and states could opt out 
of using them. We contacted all state agencies that had been in charge of administering JTPA 
and asked them whether they had used the PAW methodology during the time period of our 
study, program years 1993 through 1998. Of the 33 states that supplied this information, 29 
indicated they used the methodology and 4 indicated they did not. We include in our analysis 
only the 463 training agencies residing in the 29 states that used the PAW.   
 
Construction of the demographic subgroups: For our empirical analysis we use demographic 
subgroups rather than demographic characteristics. There were 24 adjustment factors used in 
the DOL’s adjustment model during our time period. All factors are binary (e.g. male/female). 
We omitted from our analysis the very small demographic subgroups by dropping the nine 
factors for which the factor’s minority realization represented 10 percent or fewer JTPA 
participants at any program year during our study time period (for example, because only 3 
percent of participants were SSI recipient for six program years, we omitted the“SSI 
recipient” factor).
23  We omitted two more factors due to missing demographic information 
on program participants for these factors.
24  In the end, we used 13 adjustment factors in the 
analysis. These factors are marked with a start (*) in Table 1. These 13 adjustment factors 
yield 8,192 (=2
13) demographic subgroups for each of 463 training agencies, and thus 
3,792,896 (=8,129×463) possible subgroup-agency combinations for each program year.   
 
Many of these 3,792,896 subgroup-agency cells were empty, prompting us to further limit 
the data. We excluded from the analysis all subgroup-agency combinations that had zero 
terminees in each of the six program years. Applying this criterion led us to drop 96% of the 
3,792,896 possible subgroup-agency combinations. The final panel data includes 1,670 
different subgroups for 463 agencies. The number of subgroups vary across agencies (Min=2, 
Max=1073) and there are on average 291.04 subgroups per agency. There are 134,755 
(=463×291.04) subgroup-agency observations by program year. The final analysis for 
enrolment share used 738,689 observations which is less than the total number of 
observations (808,530=134,755×6 program years) due to missing data on local economic 
conditions.  
 
Construction of the enrolment shares: The shares of subgroup terminees and the average 
performance outcomes were computed for each subgroup-agency-program year cell using 
data from the Standardized Program Information Report (SPIR). In the 463 agencies where 
the PAW were used, we have complete demographic information for 682,515 adult terminees, 
                                                 
23  Nine factors excluded from the analysis are 55 years old & over, High school dropout 
under 30, Handicapped, UI or UC claimant, SSI recipient, Limited English speaking, 
GA/RCA recipient, Veteran, and Homeless.   
24  Our cutoff for inclusion in the analysis was a 90 percent data availability rate. Thus 
because information about being “basic skills deficient” was reported for only 84% of 
participants and possessing “reading skills below 7
th grade” was reported for only 89 
percent of participants, those factors were omitted from our analysis.     47
which accounts for 63% of the entire JTPA adult population during the 1993-1998 period.
25 
This subsample appears to be representative of the entire enrollee population, however. For 
example, our sample includes 66% female, 32% black, 21% high school dropouts, and 40% 
welfare recipients and these figures are almost identical to the ones corresponding to the 
JTPA population (66% female, 32% black, 22% high school dropouts, and 37% welfare 
recipients).   
 
Construction of the performance outcomes: Since under JTPA the follow-up performance 
outcomes were measured for only a subset of all terminees, the samples for the employment 
and earnings outcomes analysis (H2) are smaller than the sample for the enrolment analysis 
(H1).
26  SPIR reports a follow-up employment outcome for 44% of terminees (N=297,352) 
and a follow-up weekly earnings outcome for 72% of the follow-up employment outcome 
sample (N=213,176). We construct the subgroups for the outcome analysis using the same 
method as above and obtain 164,488 subgroups-agency-year observations for the 




                                                 
25  The percentages of terminees included in our analysis (relative to the entire population) 
for program years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 were 53%, 65%, 65%, 67%, 65%, 
and 66%, respectively. 
26  To save money, JTPA administrators estimated each training agency’s overall 
performance from the performance of a sample of terminees drawn randomly from the 
training agency’s terminee population.   